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he merger boom in the U.S. banking industry has caused the 
number of banking organizations in the nation to fall by nearly 
a third since 1990. Most of this contraction has involved small 
community  banks,  whose  numbers  have  fallen  by  more  than  3,000 
banks. A common perception is that most of these small banks are being 
absorbed by large banks. Their disappearance is raising concerns in many 
communities because small banks are often a major source of personal 
services and relationship lending to local businesses and depositors. 
In contrast to this general perception, the effects of the merger 
boom may be quite different. Despite reducing the number of small 
banks, the merger boom may to a large extent be joining successful 
small banks with less successful ones, thereby creating stronger, more 
efficient, and better managed banks.
This article investigates the merger boom in detail, examining who 
purchased community banks, the relative performance of the merging 
banks, and the stock price premiums paid for community banks by 
large and smaller acquirers. The article suggests that the merger boom 
has the potential to strengthen the community banking sector, as some 
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community banks are taken over by other, more efficiently run com-
munity banks located in the same state. Thus, the community banks 
that have survived the merger boom may be in a good position to con-
tinue serving the local businesses and depositors who value personal 
service and relationship lending.
The first section of the article recounts the fall in the number of 
small community banks during the bank merger boom and discusses 
some of the related public concerns. The second section shows that 
many of the community banks taken over during the boom were pur-
chased by other community banks from the same state and not by larg-
er banking organizations. The third section discusses the characteristics 
of community banks that merge with each other and provides evidence 
that these mergers have the potential to create even stronger banks. The 
fourth section presents additional evidence in support of this view by 
examining the merger premiums that acquiring banks have been will-
ing to pay over the stock prices of acquired community banks.
I.   CONCERNS OVER SMALL BANk MERGERS 
The total number of community banks and their share of bank-
ing assets have fallen markedly since 1990. This section reviews the 
evidence of these declines, shows that they resulted from mergers, and 
discusses some of the reasons for public concern. 
The number of U.S. banking organizations has declined by 32 
percent during 1990-2006 (Table 1). Banking organizations include 
bank holding companies and independent banks—thrifts and saving 
organizations are not included. Small, medium-sized, and large bank-
ing organizations are defined as those with assets of less than $1 bil-
lion, between $1 billion and $10 billion, and larger than $10 billion, 
respectively, where assets are measured in 2006 prices. For convenience, 
in this article banking organizations are sometimes referred to as banks. 
Small banks are referred to as community banks. 
Most of the contraction has occurred in the community bank sec-
tor. The number of community banking organizations fell from about 
9,200 at the end of 1989 to 5,900 at the end of 2006, a 36 percent 
decline. The share of community banks in total domestic banking as-
sets also declined significantly over the period, from 18.5 to 10.5 per-
cent. In the case of medium-sized banks, the number increased by more Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  31
than 60 percent, but the share of domestic banking assets nevertheless 
shrunk (from 15.0 to 9.5 percent). Unlike community banks and me-
dium-sized banks, large banking organizations increased their share of 
U.S. banking assets significantly during the 17-year period (from 66.5 
to 80.1 percent).1
Mergers were the primary reason for the decline in the number and 
asset share of community banks during the period 1990-2006. This 
article focuses on those mergers that involved publicly traded banking 
organizations (either the acquirer or the target or both are traded on 
the exchanges or over the counter).2 There were more than 4,200 such 
mergers from 1990 through 2006 (Table 2). More than 90 percent 
of these mergers (close to 3,900) involved acquisitions of community 
banks. Despite excluding mergers in which neither bank was publicly 
traded, these 3,900 acquisitions of community banks far exceeded the 
total decline in community banking organizations shown in Table 1 
(roughly 3,300). Thus, mergers more than accounted for the sharp de-
cline in the number of community banks during the last two decades. 
Table 1
NUMBER  OF  BANKING  ORGANIzATIONS  AND  SHARE 
OF BANKING ASSETS BY SIzE OF ORGANIzATION (END 
OF YEAR)
Number of Banking Organizations  
by Asset Size
(billion)
Share of Domestic Banking Assets (%)  
by Asset Size
(billion)
< $1 $1-$10 > $10 All < $1 $1-$10 > $10 All
1989 9,193 270 89 9,552 18.5 15.0 66.4 100
1994 7,655 232 79 7,966 16.8 19.1 64.0 100
1999 6,459 338 67 6,797 13.4 10.9 75.6 100
2004 6,004 336 73 6,413 11.4 9.8 78.7 100
2005 5,957 428 71 6,385 11.2 10.3 78.4 100
2006 5,858 444 76 6,302 10.4 9.4 80.0 100
Total change -3,335 +174 -13 -3,250 -8.0 -5.5 +13.5
Note: Banking organizations include bank holding companies and independent commercial banks. 
Size thresholds are adjusted for inflation by using assets measured in 2006 prices. 
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In fact, the number of community banks would have declined even 
more if the loss of banks through mergers had not been offset by a sub-
stantial number of new charters.3 
The dramatic decline in the number and asset share of community 
banking organizations has created some concern that small businesses 
and other customers who put a premium on personal banking relation-
ships may suffer. These concerns have two sources. 
First, small business lending accounts for a considerably smaller 
share of assets at large banks than at community banks. In 2006, almost 
20 percent of community banking assets was committed to small busi-
ness lending, compared to less than 7 percent of large bank assets.4  This 
difference reflects the fact that small banks tend to make small business 
loans, while large banks tend to make large business loans. Because of 
their small size, the only way community banks can achieve portfo-
lio diversification is by making large numbers of small business loans. 
With their greater resources, large banks can make large business loans 
and still make enough loans to achieve portfolio diversification.5
table 2
ACQUISITIONS OF BANKING ORGANIzATIONS
BY SIzE OF TARGET
Number of Acquisitions (in $ billion) 
by Target’s Asset Size
Amount of Assets Acquired (in $ billion) 
by Target’s Asset Size
< $1 $1-$10 > $10 All < $1 $1-$10 > $10 All
1990-1994 1,299 83 14 1,396 118.3 177.1 357.2 652.6
1995-1999 1,383 91 30 1,504 174.6 221.9 1,452.4 1,848.9
2000-2004 784 60 21 865 122.1 131.4 1,289.7 1,543.2
2005 206 12 — 218 33.5 32.6 — 66.1

















Note: Banking organizations include bank holding companies and independent commercial banks. 
Size thresholds are adjusted for inflation by using assets measured in 2006 prices. Data include only 
those mergers in which the target or acquirer was publicly traded.
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Second, research has found that bank mergers can significantly im-
pact the supply of credit to small businesses and that the impact depends 
on the size of the acquiring banks. For small acquirers, Strahan and 
Weston (1996, 1998) find that mergers among small banks are less likely 
to cause a reduction in supply of small business credit and that small 
business lending could actually increase (rather than decrease) as a result 
of small bank mergers. For large acquirers, Peek and Rosengren (1996, 
1998) find that, unlike in small bank mergers, when a large bank ac-
quires a small bank, the target’s small business lending tends to decline. 
II.   WERE  THE  COMMUNITY  BANkS  THAT  DISAP-
PEARED ALL TAkEN OVER BY LARGE BANkS?
The previous section showed that mergers have led to a substantial 
decline in both the number and the asset share of community banking 
organizations. This section examines whether the lost community banks 
have become a part of large banking organizations or remained small. 
Most of the acquirers of community banks since 1990 have them-
selves been community banks (Table 3). In fact, more than 2,000 
community banks were acquired by other community banks during 
1990-2006, representing a little more than half of all the acquisitions 
of community banks.6 
When measured by the volume of assets acquired rather than the 
number of banks, mergers of community banks with other community 
banks did not account for as big a fraction of community bank acquisi-
tions. The reason is that the community banks acquired by medium-
sized and large banks tended to be larger than those acquired by other 
community banks. Still, even in terms of assets acquired, acquisitions 
of community banks by other community banks were quite important, 
accounting for 30 percent of all community bank assets acquired in 
mergers over the period. 
In terms of assets acquired, mergers of community banks with me-
dium-sized banks were also important, accounting for more than 40 
percent of the total assets acquired. However, only a small number of 
community banks and only about one-fourth of acquired community 
banking assets were acquired by large banks. Thus, contrary to some 
early public concerns, community banks have not been gobbled up by 
large banks.7 34  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
III.  WHAT  TYPES  OF  COMMUNITY  BANkS  MERGE 
WITH EACH OTHER AND WHY?
It has been shown that more than half of the acquirers of com-
munity banks during 1990-2006 were other community banks and 
that these acquisitions accounted for a substantial share of total acquisi-
tions of community bank assets. Have these community bank mergers 
strengthened the community banks that remain in business? To help 
answer this question, this section first discusses some of the ways in 
which mergers can make the merging banks stronger and increase their 
combined value. The section then examines important characteristics 
of acquired and acquiring community banks during 1990-2006 to de-
termine if these mergers were likely to produce stronger banks. 
How can mergers make banks stronger?
Several theories explain the various ways in which bank mergers 
can increase the combined value of the merging banks. The efficiency 
hypothesis suggests that mergers can create value through enhanced 
table 3
ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNITY BANKS BY SIzE OF 
ACQUIRER
Number of Acquisitions (in $ billion) 
by Acquirer’s Asset Size
Amount of Assets Acquired  
(in $ billion) by Acquirer’s Asset Size
<$1 $1-$10 > $10 All <$1 $1-$10 >$10 All
1990-1994 684 392 223 1,299 30.8 49.4 38.1 118.3
1995-1999 687 454 243 1,384 49.2 73.2 52.1 174.5
2000-2004 454 249 81 784 39.7 52.9 29.7 122.3
2005 123 67 16 206 14.1 14.0 5.5 33.6

















Note: Banking organizations include bank holding companies and independent commercial banks. 
Community banks are defined as banking organizations with less than $1 billion in assets. Size 
thresholds are adjusted for inflation by using assets measured in 2006 prices. Data include only 
those mergers in which the target or acquirer was publicly traded.
Source: SNL databaseefficiency, as the target’s managers are replaced by the more efficient 
managers of the acquirer. Such gains are especially likely for mergers be-
tween firms belonging to the same industry, such as banks, because the 
superior skills of the acquirer’s managers can be more easily applied to 
the operations of the target.8 Under the efficiency hypothesis, the target 
bank may have greater value to the acquirers than it had to the previ-
ous owners prior to the merger. In support of the efficiency hypothesis, 
Berger and Humphrey found that large bank acquirers tend to be more 
efficient than their targets, suggesting that the mergers were undertaken 
with the goal of improving the target’s efficiency. This article consid-
ers whether increasing the target’s efficiency has also been a motive for 
mergers between community banks. 
Another  way  mergers  between  two  banks  with  different  revenue 
streams or cost structures could create value is through diversification. 
The diversification hypothesis predicts that through diversifying mergers, 
the combined banks would benefit from reduced earnings volatility and 
default probability. The opposite of this idea is the focusing hypothesis, 
which predicts that mergers between similar banking firms would create 
more value by allowing the merging firms to concentrate in the narrow 
area in which they both do best. Becher and Campbell found that geo-
graphic diversification has been an important motive for large bank merg-
ers since the Reigle-Neal Act of 1994, which authorized full interstate 
branching. In contrast, DeLong (2001, 2003) found that more value has 
been created through focusing mergers than diversifying mergers. 
How do acquirers compare with targets?
To determine if community banks merge with each other in ways 
that could make them stronger, it is useful to compare acquirers’ and 
targets’ financial characteristics. The characteristics examined in this 
section include profitability, operational inefficiency, asset quality, loss 
reserve management, and capitalization. The section also examines the 
relative location of the acquirer and target (whether they were head-
quartered in the same state) to explore the possibility of geographic 
diversification as a primary motivation for the mergers. For mergers 
between community banks during 1990-2006, Charts 1 to 5 present 
the yearly average measures of the acquirers’ and targets’ profitability, 
inefficiency, asset quality, reserve management, and capitalization, re-
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spectively. Table 4 presents information on in-state versus out-of-state 
mergers among community banks.9 
Profitability. This characteristic is measured by return on equity 
(ROE). During the period 1990-2006, the average ROE for commu-
nity bank acquirers was consistently higher than that for targets (Chart 
1).10 Thus, community banks have been acquiring other, less-profitable 
community banks. The reason targets have been less profitable than 
acquirers may be due to inferior management at the target bank. If 
so, targets’ performance could potentially improve significantly when 
their assets are transferred to better-managed acquirers. Following the 
efficiency hypothesis, the mergers between targets and more profitable 
acquirers since 1990 may have been undertaken with the goal of real-
izing these efficiency gains.
operational inefficiency. This characteristic is measured by the ratio 
of noninterest expense to the sum of net interest income and other in-
come. By this measure, community bank acquirers have been generally 
more efficient (less inefficient) than their targets (Chart 2).11 This is an 
indication that the operations of the target could become more efficient 
if put under the management of the acquirer. As before, the efficiency 
hypothesis would suggest that mergers among community banks were 
undertaken to realize these gains. 
Asset quality and loss reserve management. Asset quality is measured 
by the ratio of nonperforming assets to total assets. Loss reserve man-
agement is proxied by the ratio of reserves set aside to absorb future 
losses to nonperforming assets. Banks with lower nonperforming asset 
ratios may be interpreted as being less risky, while banks with higher ra-
tios of loss reserves to problem assets may be viewed as being more con-
servative in their reserve management. During the period 1990-2006, 
acquirers  had  both  a  consistently  lower  nonperforming  asset  ratio 
than targets (Chart 3) and a consistently higher loss reserve ratio than 
targets (Chart 4).12 These differences suggest that acquirers may have 
had sounder lending practices and practiced more conservative reserve 
management than their targets. If so, the transfer of assets from targets 
to acquirers could improve the overall financial health of the merging 
banks—again, consistent with the efficiency hypothesis.
Capitalization. Capitalization is measured by the ratio of the book 
value of equity to total assets, which can also be viewed as the inverse Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  37
Chart 1
RETURNS ON EQUITY IN MERGERS BETWEEN  
COMMUNITY BANKS, ACQUIRERS VS. TARGETS
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chart 3
NON-PERFORMING ASSET RATIO IN MERGERS BETWEEN 
COMMUNITY BANKS, ACQUIRERS VS. TARGETS
Chart 4
LOAN LOSS RESERVE RATIO IN MERGERS BETWEEN 
COMMUNITY BANKS, ACQUIRERS VS. TARGETS
Note: Nonperforming asset ratio is (nonperforming assets/total assets) x 100, where nonperforming 
assets are the sum of nonperforming loans (nonaccrual + renegotiated) and assets acquired through 
foreclosure.
Source: SNL database
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chart 5
CAPITAL-ASSET RATIO IN MERGERS BETWEEN  
COMMUNITY BANKS, ACQUIRERS VS. TARGETS






















Number of Acquisitions Amount of Assets Acquired
(in $ Billion)
In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State
1990-1994 621 63 27.53 3.25
1995-1999 615 72 43.87 5.38
2000-2004 379 75 32.93 6.65
2005 101 22 11.40 2.66










IN-STATE VS. OUT-OF-STATE MERGERS
COMMUNITY BANKS ACQUIRED BY COMMUNITY BANKS
Note: Banking organizations include bank holding companies and independent commercial banks. 
Community banks are defined as banking organizations with less than $1 billion in assets in 2006 
prices. Data include only those mergers in which the target or acquirer was publicly traded.
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of leverage. According to one interpretation, banks with higher capital-
asset ratios are less efficient in their use of capital. In addition, a higher 
capital-asset ratio may be an indication that the bank is less able to 
diversify its portfolio and has to hold more capital to cover its greater 
risk. Over the period 2000-2006, targets had slightly higher capital-
asset ratios than acquirers in most years and much higher ratios in 2004 
(Chart 5).13 The few exceptions were 1991, 2000, 2002, and 2003, 
when the average capital-asset ratio of targets was equal to or slightly 
less than that of acquirers. The differences in capitalization between 
targets and acquirers do not appear as large as some of the other differ-
ences between targets and acquirers shown in Charts 1-4. Nevertheless, 
the data provide some support for the view that some community bank 
mergers were undertaken with the goal of making more efficient use of 
the target’s capital.
location. Location is examined in terms of in-state versus out-of-
state mergers. An in-state merger is defined as a merger in which both 
the acquirer and the target are headquartered in the same state. Com-
munity banks might be expected to want to merge with community 
banks located in other states in order to diversify geographically. In the 
early part of merger boom, analysts expected interstate mergers to rise 
in response to the passage of the 1994 Reigle-Neal Act, which for the 
first time allowed banks to have out-of-state branches. If geographic di-
versification was an important motivation for community bank merg-
ers, we should observe increasing number of mergers across state lines 
after the Reigle-Neal Act. That is, however, not the case. Even after the 
Reigle-Neal Act, few community banks merged with each other across 
state lines (Table 4). Over the entire period 1990-2006, almost 90 per-
cent of mergers between community banks were in-state mergers, and 
these mergers accounted for nearly 90 percent of all assets acquired. 
The finding that the vast majority of mergers between community 
banks have been in-state suggests that diversification across state lines 
has not been an important motivation for mergers of community banks. 
Community bank mergers have been more consistent with the “focus-
ing” hypothesis than the diversifying hypothesis. Community banks 
appear to have merged with the goal of concentrating their efforts on 
what they do best, which is to provide personal service to small busi-
nesses and other local customers. In-state mergers may have allowed Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  41
community banks to cross-sell their products and services to a larger 
pool of customers with no interruption of services to local customers 
and no risk of doing business in a new, unfamiliar market environ-
ment.14
IV.   FURTHER EVIDENCE FROM MERGER PREMIUMS
The potential gains from a merger should be reflected in the pre-
mium that the acquirer is willing to pay for the target, over and above 
the market value of the target’s stock. The greater the potential gains 
from the merger, the larger the merger premium should be. Thus, com-
paring the merger premiums offered to community bank targets by 
acquirers of different size should provide some evidence about the rela-
tive gains from community banks merging with each other rather than 
with larger banks. 
Using regression analysis, the relationship between the merger pre-
mium and the size of the acquirer was estimated for all publicly traded 
community banks acquired during 1990-2006. The merger premium 
is defined as the percent difference between the price offered by the ac-
quirer and the market value of the target’s shares just before the merger 
announcement date. Specifically, the merger premium is calculated as 
100 x (Offer Price Per Share - Target’s Market Price Per Share)/ (Target’s 
Market Price Per Share). In this calculation, the target’s market price is 
for the trading day just prior to merger announcement. 
Besides including acquirers of all size, the sample used in this sec-
tion differs from the sample in the previous section in an important 
way—it excludes all community bank targets that were privately held at 
the time of the merger announcement. It was necessary to exclude these 
targets because merger premiums can only be calculated for targets 
whose shares were publicly traded before the merger. Of the roughly 
3,900 acquisitions of community banks during 1990-2006, less than 
10 percent involved publicly traded targets. As a result, the sample used 
in this section is considerably smaller than that in the previous section, 
despite including acquirers of all sizes. 
The effect of the acquirer’s size on the merger premium is estimated 
by including dummy variables for whether the acquirer was a medium-
sized or a large bank. The coefficients on these variables show how the 42  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
merger premium paid by medium-sized and large acquirers compares 
with the merger premium paid by community bank acquirers.
To isolate the effect of the acquirer’s size on the merger premium, 
it is also necessary to control for other characteristics of the target and 
acquirer that might affect the premium. For the most part, these char-
acteristics are the same as those examined in the previous section. The 
first set of control variables are measures of the relative efficiency of the 
acquirer and target: the ratio of the acquirer’s ROE to the target’s ROE, 
the ratio of the acquirer’s inefficiency ratio to the target’s inefficiency 
ratio, the ratio of the acquirer’s nonperforming asset ratio to the target’s 
nonperforming asset ratio, the ratio of the acquirer’s loss reserve ratio to 
the target’s loss reserve ratio, and the ratio of the acquirer’s capital-asset 
ratio to the target’s capital-asset ratio. The other control variable in the 
regressions is whether the acquirer and target are located in the same 
state. According to the efficiency hypothesis, the better the manage-
ment of the acquirer is relative to that of the target, the larger the gains   
should be from transferring the target’s assets to the acquirer, and thus 
the larger the merger premium should be. Also, the focusing hypothesis 
would predict that acquirers should be willing to pay higher premiums 
for community banks located in the same state, because such acquisi-
tions allow the community bank target to continue doing what it does 
best: provide personal services to local customers. 
Another variable sometimes used to measure the potential gains 
from bank mergers is the ratio of the market value of a bank’s equity to 
the book value. This characteristic was not examined in the previous sec-
tion because it can be measured only for those targets that are publicly 
traded. However, like variables such as ROE and the inefficiency ratio, 
the market-to-book ratio can be viewed as a measure of the efficiency 
and quality of a bank’s management because investors will generally be 
willing to pay more for shares in a well-managed bank than a poorly 
managed bank. Under this interpretation, merger premiums should be 
higher for mergers in which the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer is 
high relative to that of the target because there will be more potential 
gains from replacing the target’s management with the acquirer’s.15 
The regression results are presented in Table 5. The regression in 
the first column excludes the market-to-book ratio, while the regression 
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Independent Variables (1) (2)
Intercept 93.05*** 19.95
Dummy variable for Medium-sized Acquirers -17.73* -9.13
Dummy variable for Large Acquirers -25.14*** -18.92***
Control Variables:
Acquirer’s Returns on Equity/Target’s Returns on Equity  0.03 0.53
Acquirer’s Inefficiency Ratio/Target’s Inefficiency Ratio  -60.32** -26.49*
Acquirer’s Non-Performing Assets Ratio/ 
Target’s Non-Performing Assets Ratio
-3.16* -1.83
Acquirer’s Loan Loss Reserve Ratio/ 





Acquirer’s Market-to-Book Ratio/ 
Target’s Market –to-Book Ratio 
-- 18.15***







Number of Mergers 168 137
table 5
EFFECT OF SIzE OF ACQUIRER ON MERGER PREMIUM 
FOR COMMUNITY BANK TARGETS
Note:  Sample includes all acquisitions of community banks during 1990-2006 in which the target was 
publicly traded.  Dependent variable is the Merger Premium, calculated as 100 x (offer price minus 
market price of target’s shares)/(market price of target’s shares), where the market price is for the day 
just prior to the announcement date.  Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used in calculat-
ing the statistical significance of the coefficients.  The statistical significance for the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
the regression both ways is that the relative market-to-book ratio of the 
acquirer and target may be highly correlated with the other measures 
of the relative efficiency of the acquirer and target, making it hard to 
disentangle the effects.
The most important result is that medium-sized and large banks 
were not willing to pay as high premiums for community bank targets as 
community banks were willing to pay. In the first regression, the coeffi-
cient on the dummy variable for whether the acquirer is a medium-sized 
bank is -17.7. Thus, controlling for the location and relative efficiency of 
the target and acquirer, the average merger premium that medium-sized 
banks were willing to pay for a community bank target was 17.7 percent-44  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
age points less than the premium that community banks were willing 
to pay for such a target. Similarly, the average premium that large banks 
were willing to pay for a community bank target was 25.1 percentage 
points less than community banks were willing to pay. As indicated in 
the table, these differences are statistically significant. The results from 
the second regression are similar, although the estimated effect of the 
acquirer’s size on the merger premium is not as large—9.1 percentage 
points for medium-sized acquirers and 18.9 percentage points for large 
acquirers. Overall, the results point to the conclusion that medium-sized 
and large banks were willing to pay substantially less than community 
banks to acquire community bank targets. 
Turning to the control variables, some of the regression results are 
consistent with the view that potential merger gains are greater when 
the difference in efficiency between the acquirer and target is large. 
In both regressions, the coefficients on the ratio of the acquirer’s inef-
ficiency ratio to the target’s inefficiency ratio are highly negative and 
statistically significant, implying that the merger premium is high when 
the acquirer’s inefficiency ratio is low relative to that of the target. In 
the second regression, when the market-to-book ratio is also included, 
the coefficient on the ratio of the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio to 
the target’s market-to-book ratio is highly positive and statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting that the merger premium is high when the market 
views the acquirer as being more efficient than the target. While the 
results for these two control variables are consistent with the efficiency 
hypothesis, the results for other variables such as the capital-asset ratio 
are not.16 Also, it is important to remember that the regressions in Table 
5 are for acquisitions of community banks by banks of all sizes and not 
just acquisitions by other community banks. Thus, strictly speaking, 
the results cannot be used to answer the question posed in the previous 
section—whether community banks merged with each other to take 
advantage of differences in efficiency and management quality between 
the target and the acquirer. 
Finally, the merger premium does not depend to a significant de-
gree on whether the acquirer and the target are located in the same 
state. This result may reflect the fact that many of the acquisitions in 
the sample are by medium-sized and large banks, which may not care Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  45
as much as community bank acquirers about focusing the activities of 
the merging banks.
In summary, the results of this section suggest that community 
banks can create more value when they merge with each other than 
when they merge with larger banks. This result is consistent with the 
earlier finding that more than half of community banks acquired in 
mergers during 1990-2006 were acquired by other community banks 
rather than by larger banks.
V.   CONCLUSIONS
The merger boom of 1990s and 2000s reduced both the number of 
community banks and their share of total banking assets. Some of these 
community banks disappeared through mergers with large banks. But 
many of the banks were taken over by other community banks, which 
were generally willing to pay higher premiums for the acquisitions than 
larger banks. Moreover, when community banks merged, the acquirers 
tended to be more efficient and better managed than the targets. This 
fact suggests that mergers among community banks have the potential 
to strengthen the community banking sector by creating more profit-
able and efficiently run organizations. 
The evidence presented in this article does not reveal whether the 
community banks that merged with each other were able to realize the 
potential gains from the mergers. That question can be answered only 
by seeing how community banks performed after merging with each 
other. But two independent pieces of evidence suggest that the com-
munity banking sector remains strong. First, community banks have 
continued their commitment to small business lending, investing a 
much higher percentage of their assets in such loans than larger banks. 
Second, even though thousands of community banks have disappeared 
through mergers, many new banks have been chartered at the same 
time. The continued willingness of investors and entrepreneurs to start 
new banks, most of which begin very small, suggests that community 
banking is still a highly viable line of business. 46  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
ENDNOTES
1For more information on the changing role of community banks in the 
U.S. banking system, including more information by state and region, see Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
2Information on these mergers was obtained from SNL. Details about merg-
ers between publicly traded banks are required to be reported to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). In contrast, details about mergers of privately held 
banks are often not publicly available.
3FDIC data on sources of change in the number of banks (rather than bank-
ing organizations) indicate that there were more than 2,000 new banks chartered 
during 1990-2006. Some community banks also failed during the period, but the 
loss of banks through failures was far outweighed by new charters.
4See Board of Governors. Small business loans are defined in these data as 
commercial and industrial loans less than $1 million in size. 
5See Keeton for a discussion of why large banks tend to lend less than small 
banks to small businesses. With advances in credit-scoring techniques, some large 
banks have recently expanded their “micro” business lending (Berger and Frame). 
However, despite the growth in such lending, total small business loans remain a 
much smaller share of assets at large banks than at small banks.
6Recall that the data exclude mergers in which both banks are privately held. 
If such mergers were included, the percent of acquired community banks that 
were taken over by other community banks would be even larger. 
7Some of the community banks that disappeared through mergers might 
have ended up being a part of large banks, even if they were first acquired by 
medium-sized banks. This could happen if the medium-sized acquirers were later 
taken over by large banks. During 1990-2006, more than 70 percent of acquisi-
tions of medium-sized banks were by large banking organizations.
8For a discussion of the efficiency hypothesis as applied to mergers in general, 
see Jensen and Ruback. For discussions of the hypothesis as applied to banks, see 
Berger and Humphrey, and Hanweck and Spilloff.
9The number of mergers used varies among Charts 1 to 5 due to missing values 
for some of the characteristics. If the data on a particular characteristic was not avail-
able for either the target or the acquirer, the merger is excluded from the analysis.
10For the 1,978 mergers shown in Charts 1, the average difference between 
the ROE of acquirers and targets was 6.4 percentage points, which is significant 
at the 1 percent level.
11For the 1,128 mergers shown in Chart 2, the average difference between 
the inefficiency ratios of targets and acquirers was 6.6 percentage points, which is 
significant at the 1 percent level.
12For the 1,371 mergers shown in Chart 3, the nonperforming asset ratio 
of targets was about double that of acquirers, and the average difference was 0.7 Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  47
percentage points. For the 540 mergers shown in Chart 4, the average difference 
between the loss reserve ratios of targets and acquirers was 56.2 percentage points. 
Both differences are significant at the 1 percent level.
13For the 1,817 mergers shown in Chart 5, the average difference between 
the capital-asset ratio of targets and acquirers was 1.07 percentage points, which 
is significant at the 1 percent level.
14The data on in-state versus out-of-state mergers do not rule out that some 
community bank mergers were undertaken to diversify across different parts of 
the same state—for example, across rural areas and urban areas. 
15The regressions were also estimated with year dummies, but the coefficients 
on the dummies were not statistically significant and the other results were un-
changed. Another set of factors that could impact merger premiums but are not 
included in the analysis involve the target’s corporate governance and potential con-
flict of interest between managers and shareholders (Brewer, Jackson, and Jagtiani).
16 Less-capitalized community bank targets tended to receive larger merger 
premiums. Hannan and Pilloff discuss some of the reasons why acquirers might 
be more willing to acquire a poorly capitalized bank than a well-capitalized bank 
of the same size.48  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
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